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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Cases
Appellant Jennifer Hull appeals from her judgment of conviction, suspended sentence

and order of probation, entered on her conditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence
("DUI") with an excessive blood alcohol concentration in violation of LC. § 18-8004C, which
was a felony by virtue of a previous excessive DUI conviction within five years. This Court
should vacate Jennifer's conviction and remand with instruction to allow her to withdraw her
guilty plea because the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

B.

General Course of Proceedings
Just before 5:00 p.m. on December 8, 2017, Jennifer was speeding along a road in

southwest Boise when her car left the road, rolled approximately seven times and landed on its
roof in a field, with wreckage strewn about. Exhibits 1-4; Tr. p. 8, ln. 7-13; p. 10, ln. 5-21; p. 14,
ln. 1-10. The responding officer found Jennifer laying on her stomach on the car's roof, between
the front seats and back seats, breathing but non responsive. Tr. p. 8, ln. 13 - p. 9, ln. 7.
Paramedics removed Jennifer from her vehicle and transported her to the hospital. Tr. p. 15, ln.
1-20.
A little over an hour after receiving the dispatch regarding the accident, the officer found
Jennifer in the emergency room wearing a neck brace and with a nurse treating her injuries. Tr. p.
16, ln. 18 - p. 17, ln. 13; Exhibit 6. 1 The officer advised Jennifer she had been the only person

Exhibit 6 is the officer's on body video (OBV), which was during the hearing on the motion to
suppress. R. 52; Tr. 26, ln. 14-25.
1
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involved in a wreck in which her car had been traveling about 60 mph in a 35 mph zone before
leaving the road, flipping seven to eight times and landing in a filed. Exhibit 6 at :43-7:28. The
nurse told the officer that Jennifer was not following instruction to keep still and to not allow her
to move. Exhibit 6 at 00:00-00:40. Nonetheless, as the officer questioned Jennifer about the
accident, Jennifer continually moved her head despite ongoing reminders not to move. Id. at
43-13:00.
Jennifer told the officer and nurse that she drank the previous day until she fell asleep
"before I started talking to [the officer]." Id. at 11 :00-12:00. The nurse commented the smell of
alcohol was too strong to be from the previous day and asked Jennifer when the last time she
drank the day of the accident, to which Jennifer responded: "Today? ... I don't even know what
today is." Id. at 12:00-12:15. After the nurse told Jennifer it was 6:08 p.m. on Friday, December
8, she explained she did not know when she drank that day and was not trying to be dishonest.

Id. at 12: 10-12:34. The nurse again told Jennifer to not "shake her head so much" since they
were trying to keep it straight and clarified they did not think she was being difficult and that she
"might have a pretty good head injury. So if you feel confused, it's because you whacked your
head pretty good." Id. at 12:25-12:55.
After about thirteen minutes, the officer informed Jennifer he was investigating a DUI
and that he would read an advisory concerning her rights. However, the officer first stepped
outside the patient room, switched off his microphone and spoke via phone with his supervisor.
Tr. p. 25, In. 12-25. After completing the call and returning to the patient room, the officer
reiterated that he was investigating a DUI and read the ALS advisory. After the advisory, the
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officer held up a blood kit and explained that he wanted to take a blood sample as the evidentiary
test. Exhibit 6, 20:27. The following exchange then occurred:
Jennifer:
Officer:
Jennifer:
Nurse:
Jennifer:
Officer:
Nurse:
Officer:
Jennifer:
Nurse:
Officer:
Jennifer:
Officer:
Jennifer:
Nurse:
Jennifer:

Can I ask a question?
You can ask a question.
Is that normal? (gesturing at the blood kit)
This? Process?
No, well like. Is it normal to give him a blood sample?
Well ...
You are required by law.
Yeah, you're ...
Oh.
So yeah.
Yeah, you're required by law to
Totally fine, I was just asking
That portion I read about refusing ...
No I know.
This happens all the time.
Oh, well. I know, I know.

Id. at 20:25-21 :00. The officer explained he was not arresting her and would issue a citation as
Jennifer simultaneously reassured the officer that she got it and had just been asking and was not
questioning his authority. Id. at 21:01- 21 :21.
The nurse and officer then explained that they could not draw blood from Jennifer's IV
for the officer and would need to do another "poke" with another "stick." Id. at 21 :40-21 :50. The
following exchange then occurred:
Jennifer:
Nurse:
Officer:
Jennifer:
Nurse:
Officer:

Oh.
We have to do another poke okay?
Real quick, okay?
Can I sit up, or do I have do it?
No no, sweet heart.
Yeah, you just [keep] laying right there.

Jennifer:

Can I vape?
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Nurse:
Officer:
Nurse:
Officer:
Jennifer:
Nurse:
Officer:
Rachel:
Officer:

Hahaha, Oh no!
Can you what?
Vape, No!
No.
So I guess I can't do anything.
No, sweet heart.
No.
You're kind of under our, supervision.
Hang in tight. There is not even a vape here for you.

Id. at 23: 10-23 :2 7. A few seconds later, the nurse indicated: "You have tiny little arms girl
friend ... don't move." Id. at 23:36-23:43. Jennifer inquired: "Can I really go outside at some
point though?" and the nurse responded: "no, not til you're discharged home," which would
probably be later that night. Id. at 23:43 23:50. Just before the blood draw, Jennifer again asked
where the accident happened. Id. at 26:19-26:33.
As the nurse prepared to take Jennifer's blood, she instructed: "Don't move your arm
around while I do this, Alright?" and Jennifer assured the nurse: "I wont, I swear." Id. at 26:34.
About twenty seconds later, Jennifer called out in pain: "Ah, yep don't like it. Ah I don't like it"
and the nurse reassured her: "It's all good." Id. at 26:53. After another approximate twenty
seconds Jennifer inquired if the blood draw was done and the nurse soothed: "Not quite sweet
heart." Id.
The nurse then asked the officer: "You ever try to do this before? ... it's like the blood in
the tube isn't filling as rapidly as I thought it would." Id. at 27:34. The officer commented on the
need to be hydrated as the nurse called for a technician. The nurse again told Jennifer: "Don't
move, Don't move" as she said "okay" writhing in pain. Id. at 8:30.
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Jennifer inquired: "Can you ask for someone?" and the nurse responded: "No you're fine
sweet heart. I'm right here, I know it hurts." Id. at 29:05. Jennifer confirmed: "Yeah .... It hurts
really bad" and the nurse again soothed:" I know sweet heart." Id. at 29:25. After the blood
draw, Jennifer asked again about the car accident -

where it was and whether anyone else was

involved. Id. at 29:55-31 :00. The nurse again asked about any details Jennifer remembered and
Jennifer indicated she did not, explaining again she was not trying to be uncooperative. Id. at
31:24.
The blood test results ultimately revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .344 and, on
February 15, 2018, the state charged Jennifer with an excessive DUI, which was a felony by
virtue of Jennifer's previous conviction for an excessive DUI in 2016. LC. § 18-8004C. R. 9-10.
Jennifer moved to suppress the blood draw evidence, arguing that the officer's claim she was
required to submit to the blood test rendered her implied consent invalid. R. 32-38. Thus, since
neither consent nor another exception to the warrant requirement justified the officer's seizure of
Jennifer's blood, the test results must be suppressed. R. 32-38. In response, the state argued that
the officer properly advised Jennifer she was required to submit to the blood test and because
Jennifer did not affirmatively revoke her implied consent, it was irrelevant whether that consent
was rendered involuntary by the officer's actions. R. 43.
The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding Jennifer's consent continued to
be valid because she did not revoke it or physically resist the blood draw. R. 61. The district
court found because Jennifer responded to the officer's question whether she remember the part
he read about "refusing it" with "I know" and "I'm fine," she did not interpret the officer's his
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previous, unambiguous statements that she was required by law to submit to the breath test at
face value. R. 61. The officer concluded that because Jennifer did not attempt to revoke her
implied consent, her consent continued to be voluntary and justified the warrantless seizure of
her blood. R. 61-62.
Jennifer thereafter entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving her right to appeal the
district court's denial of her motion to suppress. R. 63- 67. On December 15, 2018, the district
court entered judgment, suspended the sentence and placed Jennifer on probation. R. 83-88. This
appeal follows.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Hull's motion to suppress because the officer's
claim she was required to submit to the blood test rendered her consent involuntary and no other
exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless seizure of her blood?

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. HULL'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE OFFICER'S CLAIM SHE WAS
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO THE BLOOD TEST RENDERED HER CONSENT
INVOLUNTARY UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND NO
OTHER EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT JUSTIFIED THE
WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF HER BLOOD
This Court reviews a district court's order on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated
standard ofreview. State v. Charlson, 160 Idaho 610, 616, 377 P.3d 1073, 1079 (2016); State v.
Purdum, 14 7 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). This Court accepts the trial court's

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the trial court's
application of constitutional principles in light of those facts. Charlson, 160 Idaho at 616, 377 P.
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3d at 1079.
A DUI suspect has a constitutional right to refuse a blood alcohol test, which is a search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section
17 of the Idaho Constitution. the Fourth Amendment. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160,
2184-85 (2016); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 165 (2013); State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862,
868, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 419, 337 P.3d 575, 578 (2014).
Moreover, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable
and the state bears the burden to establish the seizure fell within a well-recognized exception to
the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Charlson,
160 Idaho at 616, 377 P.3d at 1079.
While exigency is a well-excepted exception to the warrant requirement, the alcohol's
natural metabolization in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigency that justifies an
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Charlson, 160 Idaho at 616, 377 P.3d at
1079. Here, the state did not attempt to justify the warrantless seizure by exigency. Nor could a
blood test be administered justified based on the search incident to an arrest exception to the
warrant requirement. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185; Charlson, 160 Idaho at 615, 377 P.3d at
1078.
Instead, the state relied solely on implied consent to justify under the seizure. By driving
on Idaho roads, drivers implicitly consent to blood alcohol testing when there is reasonable cause
to suspect impaired driving. LC. § 18-8002. To justify a seizure based on the implied consent
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statute, the state must show that a driver continues to give voluntary consent after initially
consenting voluntarily. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423, 337 P.3d at 582; State v. Ortega-Vastida, 161
Idaho 864, 866, 392 P.3d 42, 44 (Ct. App. 2017).
Here, the district court failed to identify and apply the relevant constitutional standard,
concluding that consent continues to be voluntary unless revoked. Further, the district court
declined to consider the totality of the circumstances including evidence of Jennifer's subjective
vulnerable state, instead finding that her responses to the officer's attempt to clarify "refusal"
evidenced a clear understanding of her constitutional right to refuse. The district court erred in
failing to recognize that Jennifer's acquiescence to the officer's claim of authority was not
consent and in denying her motion to suppress.

A.

Revocation Is Not Relevant To The Voluntariness Of Consent In These
Circumstances
Generally, "the statutorily provided implied consent is valid and remains in place until

affirmatively withdrawn" and the state is not required to confirm a driver's ongoing consent.

Charlson, 160 Idaho at 618, 3 77 P.3d at 1081. However, mere acquiescence to a claim of
authority by a law enforcement officer does not constitute voluntary consent. Bumper v. North

Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548--49 (1968); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488, 163 P.3d 1194, 1200
(2007); Lutton, 161 Idaho at 560, 388 P.3d at 75. If under all the circumstances, it appears that
the consent was involuntarily authority -

that it was granted only in submission to a claim of lawful

then the consent is invalid and the search unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamante,

412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973); Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-549; State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153,
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158, 657 P.2d 17, 22 (1983). The state bears the burden to prove that consent was voluntary by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
Here, the state argued that since the officer had no duty to inform Jennifer she had a
constitutional right to refuse the blood test, her statutorily provided implied consent remained
valid unless affirmatively withdrawn. Tr. p. 38, In. 22 - p. 39, 3. p. 39, In. 14-18. Similarly, the
district court reasoned that implied consent could only become involuntary if affirmatively
withdrawn since implied consent justifies a blood draw from an unconscious person. Tr. p. 42, In.
3-7.
However, coercion and consent cannot co-exist. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550. In Ch/arson
the Court noted there was "no contention that [the officer] told [the defendant] that he was
required to submit to the blood test" before holding implied consent remains valid and in place
until affirmatively withdrawn. Charlson, 160 Idaho at 618, 377 P.3d at 1081. Here, Jennifer's
consent became involuntary when she submitted believing she had no right to refuse, not because
the blood draw was physically compelled after recognizing and invoking the right to refuse.
Unlike an unconscious person, Jennifer's acquiescence was secured by claiming she
could not refuse. Whether she resisted or tried to revoke in the face of that claim of authority was
not relevant. The district court thus erred in concluding Jennifer continued to voluntary consent
because she did not resist the officer's instruction that she was required to submit.

B.

The District Court Failed To Consider The Totality Of The Circumstances
To determine whether Jennifer continued to give voluntary consent at the time of the

blood draw, the district court was obligated to consider the totality of the circumstances, which

9

included of her vulnerable subjective state. See State v. Lutton, 161 Idaho 556, 560, 388 P.3d 71,
75 (Ct. App. 2017); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006).
Relevant surrounding circumstances include whether the individual knew she could refuse and
whether she was free to leave. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 248-49; State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461,465 (Ct. App. 2002); State v.

Jones, 126 Idaho 791, 793, 890 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Ct. App. 1995). Consent may be expressed
through words, gestures, or other conduct. State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 325,
327 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct.App.1999).
Throughout the video, Jennifer evidenced obvious pain, inability to answer the questions,
delayed processing, memory problems and disorientation. The officer and nurse both advised
Jennifer the law required her to submit to the blood test and consistent with her cooperative
conduct throughout the video, Jennifer reassured the officer that she understood, that it was
"fine" and she would not resist his lawful order. Then, just prior to the blood draw, the officer
and nurse confirmed Jennifer was in their custody and told her to hold still when she expressed
reservations about the separate "poke." Jennifer then cried out in pain and repeatedly asked
whether the blood draw was finished.
Rather than carefully sift through these facts, the district court found Jennifer did not
present evidence of her "subjective understanding" because she asked the court to infer that
understanding from the totality of the circumstances, such as those discussed above. See R. 61, n.
3. However, fact-finders almost always determine a defendant's subjective intent from
circumstantial evidence. The video recording of the blood draw certainly includes "objective
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facts" indicating that Jennifer believed she was required to give the blood sample.
When law enforcement announces the suspect has no right to resist the search, the claim
of authority coerces the suspect to acquiesce. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550. The nurse advised
Jennifer she was required to give the officer blood, which the officer echoed "Yeah, you're
required by law to." All Jennifer's subsequent conduct was acquiescence to the officer's claim of
authority.
The district court also concluded that Jennifer objectively manifested that she knew she
could refuse the blood draw because she asked whether the nurse whether the process was
normal. R. 61, n. 3. Regardless of Jennifer's intent in asking the nurse whether the blood test was
"normal," the nurse and the officer's responses resoundingly communicated that the law required
Jennifer to give the officer blood and that the nurse would assist him.
The district court found that Jennifer must have known she could refuse the blood test,
even though the officer told her she was required by law to submit, because the ALS advisory
included her administrative right to refuse and the officer started to clarify that right when
Jennifer assured the officer it was "fine" and she was not questioning his authority.
However, the officer's subsequent, partial attempt to explain the audio advisory did not
negate his clear message just moments earlier that the law required Jennifer's submission. This is
particularly true given that Jennifer evidenced difficulty paying attention during the advisory,
dividing her attention between the nurse, officer and her obvious physical discomfort. The
totality of the circumstances establish that Jennifer's reassurances that it was fine reflected her
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acquiescence to the officer's claim the officer required her submission, not that she understood
that she had a right to refuse.
By failing to consider the totality of the circumstances and Jennifer's subjective,
vulnerable state, the district court failed to apply the applicable constitutional principles to the
relevant facts. The video establishes that Jennifer acquiesced to the blood draw after the officer
communicated she had no right to refuse. The district court erred in denying the motion to
suppress.

C.

The District Court's Finding That There Were "No Objective Facts" To Reflect
That Jennifer Believed She Was Required To Give The Blood Sample Was Clearly
Erroneous
The district court found that Jennifer freely submitted to the blood draw without showing

any signs of physical or verbal resistance and that there were "no objective facts" to reflect that
Jennifer believed she was required to give the blood sample. R. 61. However, Jennifer's conduct
and the circumstances in the video establish Jennifer submitted because she believed she was
required to and the district court's contrary findings are clearly erroneous.
When advised by the officer and nurse that they could not draw blood from Jennifer's IV
and would need to do another "poke" with another "stick," Jennifer asked if she could sit up and
whether she had to "do it." Exhibit 6, 21:40-21:50. The nurse advised "no no, sweet heart" and
the officer affirmed, telling Jennifer to continue laying where she was. Id. at 23:10-23:27.
Jennifer joked whether she could vape and conceded, "I guess I can't do anything." The nurse
again reaffirmed: "No, sweet heart." The officer echoed: "no" and the nurse continued: "you're
kind of under our, supervision." The officer advised: "hang in tight." Id. at 23: 10-23:27. Jennifer
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inquired: "Can I really go outside at some point though?" Id. at 23:36-23:43. The nurse
responded: "no, not til you're discharged home." Id. at 23:43 23:50. Having established Jennifer
was not free to leave, the nurse instructed Jennifer not to move as she prepared to take her blood.
Twenty seconds later, Jennifer called out in pain: "Ah, yep don't like it. Ah I don't like it"
and the nurse reassured her: "It's all good." Id. at 26:3426:53. After another approximate twenty
seconds Jennifer inquired if the blood draw was done and the nurse soothed: "Not quite sweet
heart." As the process dragged on, the nurse then asked the officer: "You ever try to do this
before? ... it's like the blood in the tube isn't filling as rapidly as I thought it would." Id. at
27:34. The nurse again told Jennifer: "Don't move, Don't move" as Jennifer said "okay" while
exhibiting pain. Id. at 28:30. Jennifer then asked for "someone" and the nurse responded: "No
you're fine sweet heart. I'm right here, I know it hurts." Id. at 29:05. Jennifer confirmed: "Yeah ..
. . It hurts really bad" and the nurse again soothed: "I know sweet heart." Id. at 29:25.
Its not possible to construe Jennifer's conduct during the blood draw as anything other
than objective facts manifesting resistance and that she was submitting to a process that she
clearly did not want to endure because she was instructed the law required her submission.
Jennifer acquiesced to the officer's claim of lawful authority that she was required by law to
provide him with a blood sample. The totality of the circumstances establish that Jennifer's
consent was involuntary and that the search and seizure of her blood unreasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION
The officer encountered Jennifer injured, in pain and with significant memory and
attention difficulties. After reading the hyper-technical ALS advisory, the officer and nurse
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instructed Jennifer that she was required to submit to the blood test. The officer and nurse
reaffirmed their control over Jennifer, not allowing her to move and confirming she was not free
to leave. Jennifer thereafter acquiesced to the officer's claim of authority, notwithstanding
obvious discomfort and pleas for the blood draw to be over.
The district court nonetheless refused to suppress the blood test result, finding Jennifer
was required to affirmatively revoke implied consent and no evidence showed that Jennifer
believed the officer's indication she was required to submit to the blood test. However, the
totality of the circumstances establish that Jennifer's mere acquiescence to the officer's claim of
authority was not voluntary consent and the district court erred in denying Jennifer's motion to
suppress. Accordingly, this Court should vacate Jennifer's conviction and remand with
instruction to allow her to withdraw her guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of July 2019.

FYFFE LAW, LLC

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Jennifer Hull
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on July 17, 2019, I served the foregoing document via the File and Serve
system to the email that was identified as the service contact for the Criminal Appellate Unit of
the Office of the Attorney General.

Isl Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
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